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Introduction  
A very important motive of economics has been the explanation of choices and 
decisions of agents in real life situations. To prove why there is equilibrium in 
free market where supply and demand are regulated by prices (Arrow, Debreu, 
1954), or to explain failure of economic system during crisis and why it give rise 
to unemployment and recession (Taouil, 2004), one have recourse to the 
microeconomic approaches of consumers and producers decision.   
To formulate logic consistent and practical model of free exchange market and to 
explain preferences and actual decisions of agents, utility functions and their 
derivatives have been mathematically useful and efficient during past decades. In 
such model, hypothesis of perfect rationality is assumed, in the sense that all 
agents tend to maximize their utility functions subject to budget constraint 
(Balasko, 1998). But despite its convenience and theoretical success, the concept 
of rationality was not able to integrate all complexities and diversities of agent’s 
behavior. Some new ideas like information asymmetry, bounded rationality and 
uncertainty were developed in order to furnish a more realistic description of 
human actions involved in the economic world which is in perpetual expansion 
and transformation. At the same register, many approaches for exploring social 
and psychic dimensions in economic activity were elaborated (Simon, 1986, 
Keizer, 2007).  
In this paper we establish a connection between classical and social approaches in 
the mathematical framework defined by referential preferences presented in 
previous work (Goucha, 2012). In the first paragraph we introduce the notion of 
reference vector which serves as a tool of comparison and assessment of 
commodities, and we analyze in the second how the choice of such vector may 
affect individual behavior. This analysis has allowed to build bridge between 
social and rational points of view of economic activity.  
 
1. Referential preferences and vectors  
A first definition of referential preferences (RP) was given by Goucha (2012). 
This new approach consists to classify bundles of commodities represented in ܴା௟  
by using matrix action’s on the vector space. In fact, it is easy to check that any 
matrix subgroup ܩ	 ⊆ ܩܮሺ݈, ܴሻ induces an equivalence relation on Rl defined as 
following:  
∀	ݔ, ݕ	 ∈ 	ܴ௟, ݔ~ݕ		݂݂݅		∃	ܯ ∈ ܩ	ݏݐ	ܯ ൈ ݔ ൌ ݕ.       
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 In microeconomics, equivalence relations determines indifference set of 
consumption, but since this is not sufficient to give a totally (complete) preorder 
on ܴା௟  which is necessary to define preferences, some other conditions are needed.  
 
Axiom 1. Let G a matrix subgroup of ܩܮሺ݈, ܴሻ with a globally invariant action 
on	ܴା௟ .             
For all	ݔ ∈ ܴାା௟ , there is a unique ݒ௫ ∈ ܴାand	ܯ௫ ∈ ܩ such that	ݔ ൌ ݒ௫ሺܯ௫ ൈ ܫሻ, 
where 		ܫ ൌ 	൭
1
⋮
1
൱ 	∈ 	ܴ௟.  
We can deduce a preference relation on ܴାା௟  if axiom 1 is verified for some  
group G. Indeed, we say that x is more desirable than y when 	ݒ௫ ൐ 	ݒ௬,  and they 
are equivalent if		ݒ௫ ൌ 	ݒ௬. 
We simply note that	ݒ௫ ൌ 	ݒ௬	 ⟺	∃	ܯ	 ∈ ܩ	such	that	ܯ ൈ ݔ ൌ ݕ		 ⟺ ݔ	~	ݕ.          
 
Definition 1 (Referential preferences). We say that a preference relation on ܴାା௟  is 
of reference type, or referential, whenever it is given by a matrix subgroup G 
which satisfies axiom 1.   
In many examples, axiom 1 is available for all	ݔ ∈ ܴା௟   and the above definition 
can be extended to all commodities in	ܴା௟ . If this is not the case we assume that 
all ݔ ∈ 	ܴାା௟   are preferred to anything on the boundary.  
The above axiom is not only a new mathematical formulation of a well-known 
notion, but it express an economic point of view which asserts that when an agent 
has to choose between two commodity bundles, he compares them to a third one 
which is familiar to him and more simple to estimate. This bundle represents a 
kind of personal reference value and is given by: ݒ ൈ ܫ	 ൌ 	ቌ
ݒ
ݒ
⋮
ݒ
ቍ.  
Other information about preferences given by axiom 1 reveals that the value	ݒ௫ 
attributed by agent to the bundle	ݔ	 ∈ ܴା௟ 	depends on his proper vision of intrinsic 
relations between the l commodities. For example, if he considers 
that		൬ݐ 00 1/ݐ൰ ቀ
1
1ቁ	~	ቀ
1
1ቁ , ∀	ݐ ൐ 0, then he attributes 1 (1 as one unity of value) 
to the bundle	൬ 21/2൰. But if he believes that the matrix group ൜	൬
ݐ 0
0 1/ݐଶ൰ , ݐ ൐ 0ൠ 
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is more adequate to describe relations in the consumption set, then he attributes to 
the same bundle the value √2య  since we have: ൬ 21/2൰ ൌ √2
య 	൭√4
య 0
0 ଵ√ଵ଺య
൱ ቀ11ቁ	 . 
This remark suggests that referential preferences lead to deduce values of bundles 
from the existing symmetries between commodities(1). Among these symmetries 
naturally given by matrix subgroups of	ܩܮሺ݈, ܴሻ, agent decides to choose one to 
formulate his preferences. At this record, Marin Dinu emphasizes in recent 
editorial the importance of internalization of symmetries intentionality in the 
configuration of economic reality (Dinu, 2013).   
The role of symmetries being mentioned, we return with the following statement 
to the main theme of this paper which is obviously the reference vectors.  
We will show that if axiom 1 is valid for a group G, then it may be formulated 
with any other vector ܺ ∈ ܴାା௟  instead of	ܫ ൌ 	൭
1
⋮
1
൱.  
 
Proposition 1. Let G be a matrix subgroup which verifies axiom1 and a 
vector	ܺ ∈ ܴାା௟ . Then for all	ܻ ∈ ܴାା௟ , there is a unique ݒ௬௫ ∈ ܴା  and ܯ௬௫ ∈ ܩ 
such that	ܻ ൌ 	ݒ௬௫ሺܯ௬௫ ൈ ܺሻ.  
 
Proof: By axiom1 there is ݒ௫, ݒ௬ ∈ 	ܴା∗ , ܽ݊݀	ܯ௫,ܯ௬ ∈ ܩ such that ܺ ൌ 	ݒ௫ܯ௫ ൈ
ܫ and 	ܻ ൌ ݒ௬ܯ௬ ൈ ܫ. But since all matrices in G are invertible, then we have	ܫ ൌ
	 ଵ௩ೣ ܯ௫ି
ଵ ∙ ܺ. This leads to the following equality: 
ܻ ൌ 	ݒ௬ ቆܯ௬ ቀ ଵ௩ೣ ܯ௫ି
ଵ ൈ ܺቁቇ ൌ 	 ௩೤௩ೣ 	൫ܯ௬ܯ௫ି
ଵ ൈ ܺ൯,  
or equivalently ܻ ൌ ݒ௬௫ܯ௬௫ ൈ ܺ  
where 	ݒ௬௫ ൌ ௩೤௩ೣ 	ܽ݊݀	ܯ௬
௫ ൌ ܯ௬ܯ௫ି ଵ.  
To prove the uniqueness, suppose that there is	ݑ ൐ 0	ܽ݊݀	ܯ ∈ ܩ	with	ሺݑ,ܯሻ ്
ሺݒ௬௫,ܯ௬௫ሻ  and  ܻ ൌ ݑሺܯ ൈ ܺሻ . Consider the relation ܺ ൌ 	ݒ௫ܯ௫ ൈ ܫ,	we obtain 
that 	ܻ ൌ ݑ ൈ ݒ௫ሺܯ ൈܯ௫ ൈ ܫሻ . By axiom 1 and uniqueness of 	ݒ௬	ܽ݊݀	ܯ௬ , we 
deduce that ݑ ൈ ݒ௫ ൌ ݒ௬  and ܯ ∙ൈൌ 	ܯ௬  which states that ݑ ൌ ௩ೣ௩೤ ൌ ݒ௬
௫  and  
ܯ ൌ ܯ௬ ൈܯ௫ି ଵ ൌ ܯ௬௫.	 
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The previous proposition suggests the new formulation of axiom 1:    
 
Axiom 1. Let G be a matrix subgroup with globally invariant action on	ܴା௟  and a 
vector 	ܴ ∈ ܴାା௟ . Then for all	ݔ ∈ ܴାା௟  there is a unique	ݒ௫ ∈ ܴା∗  and	ܯ௫ ∈ ܩ	such 
that 	ݔ ൌ ݒ௫ሺܯ௫ ൈ ܴሻ.     
Referential preferences described by Axiom 1′ are given in a same manner as 
axiom 1. We say that x is more desirable than y when 	ݒ௫ ൐ 	ݒ௬ , and they are 
equivalent if		ݒ௫ ൌ 	ݒ௬.  
 
Corollary. Axioms 1 and 1′ are equivalent.      
 
Proof: According to proposition 1, axiom 1 implies axiom 1′, and the converse 
follows by applying the latter to	ܫ ൌ 	൭
1
⋮
1
൱.   
In the light of what preceded, the following definition becomes not only possible 
but also well justified:   
 
Definition 2. A vector ܴ ∈ ܴାା௟ which verifies axiom	1′ for some group G is called 
a reference vector (RV), or more simply the referential.  
At present, referential preferences are not only given by matrix subgroup G, but, 
unless to prove its neutrality in the decision process, it is also specified by a 
referential	ܴ ∈ ܴାା௟ . The role of R in the determination of individual demand and 
agent behavior will be the subject of the second paragraph.  
 
2. References and choices in economic exchanges 
For Simon, rationality in classical economics is viewed in terms of the choices it 
produces; while in the other social sciences it is viewed in terms of the processes 
it employs (Simon, 1986). What we make an attempt to give some answer here, is 
the relationship between the final choice and the process of decision in the case of 
individual demand. More precisely, how the reference vector which takes his 
place in the process can affect or not an agent’s choice. To obtain a “first 
estimation” of response (term which come across further), let us compute and 
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compare demand of three consumers having the same matrix subgroups of 
preferences and budget constraint, while their reference vectors are different.   
 
Example: Consider a market with two commodities, ݌ ൌ ሺଵସ ,
ଷ
ସ	ሻ the price vector 
and w=200 the budget of three consumers with RP given by the matrix subgroup 
ܩ ൌ 	 ൜൬t 00 1/t൰ , t ∈ 	Rା∗ 	ൠ  and by, ܴଵ ൌ ቀ
2
1	ቁ , ܴଶ ൌ ቀ
1
3	ቁ , ܴଷ ൌ ൬
1
1/2	൰,	  as 
respective RV.  
Since the preorder on the consumption set is given by	ݒ ൌ ݒ௫  where		ݔ ൌ ݒ௫ ൈሺܯݔൈܴሻ, then the following problem determines consumer demand: 
	൜ Maximize	ݒ௫subject	to	the	constraint		ۦ݌|ݔۧ ൌ ݓ 
 
Consumer 1. For all consumption bundle ݔ ∈ 	ܴାା௟ 	  there is a unique ݒ௫ ൐ 0 
and	ܯ௫ ∈ ܩ, such that	ݔ ൌ ݒ௫ ൈ ሺܯ௫ ൈ ܴଵሻ. Then to determine demand we have 
to resolve the following problem: Max	ݒ௫ such that 〈൬1/43/4൰	 , ݒ௫ ቆ
ݐ 0
0 ଵ௧ቇ	ቀ
2
1ቁ〉 	ൌ
200	 or equivalently, find Max	ݒ୶	such	that	ݒ௫ ቀ௧ଶ ൅
ଷ
ସ௧ቁ ൌ 200.  
A simple calculus gives that at 	ݐ ൌ 	ඥ3/2  the maximal value of  ݒ௫ is reached 
and it is equal	ݒ௠௔௫ ൌ ଶ଴଴ඥଷ/ଶ . With these data, we obtain that the demand of the 
first consumer is:  
ଵܺ ൌ 	 ଶ଴଴ඥଷ/ଶ
ۉ
ۈ
ۇට
ଷ
ଶ 0
0 ଵ
ටయమی
ۋ
ۊቀ21ቁ ൌ ൬
400
400/3൰	   
 
Consumer 2.  In a similar manner, we have to resolve the following problem of 
maximization: Max	ݒ௫  such that 〈൬1/43/4൰	 , ݒ௫ ቆ
ݐ 0
0 ଵ௧ቇ	ቀ
1
3ቁ〉 	ൌ 200  or 
equivalently: 	Max	ݒ௫	such	that	ݒ௫ ቀ௧ସ ൅
ଽ
ସ௧ቁ ൌ 200. We obtain that ܯܽݔ	ݒ௫ ൌ
ସ଴଴
ଷ  
given at ݐ ൌ 	3 and the demand of consumer 2 is equal to:   
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ܺଶ ൌ 	4003 ൭
3 0
0 13
൱ ቀ13ቁ ൌ ൬
400
400/3൰ 
 
Consumer 3. We have the following problem of maximization: Max	ݒ௫ such that 
〈൬1/43/4൰	 , ݒ௫ ቆ
ݐ 0
0 ଵ௧ቇ	൬
1
1/2൰〉 	ൌ 200  or equivalently: Max	ݒ௫	such	that	ݒ௫ ቀ
௧
ସ ൅
38ݐൌ200. For	 ݐൌ	 32 , the maximal value of	 ݒ	 is reached and we have ܯܽݔ	
ݒ௫ ൌ 400ටଶଷ	 and the demand of consumer three follows as:  
ܺଷ ൌ 	400ටଶଷ
ۉ
ۈ
ۇට
ଷ
ଶ 0
0 ଵ
ටయమی
ۋ
ۊ൬ 11/2൰ ൌ ൬
400
400/3൰  
In these three cases, individual demand remains the same what seems to suggest 
that referential has no impact on optimal choice of agent. We observe also that 
optimal value of 	ݒ௫  took three different values. Economically speaking, agent 
satisfaction given by ܯܽݔ	ݒ௫ depends inter alia on its reference vector, but it is 
not, and more precisely, it should not be the case of its demand. However, since 
this observation is only based on examples, we first need a more general result 
proving the neutrality of RV in the optimization of individual choice. Actually, 
according to Goucha (2012), existence of demand function in the referential 
preference setting given by matrix subgroup G and ܫ ൌ 	൭
1
⋮
1
൱ as RV is subject to 
the following condition:  
 
Axiom 2. There is a unique matrix 	ܯഥ ∈ ܩ  such that:  0 ൏ ۦܫ|ܯഥ ൈ ܫ	ۧ ൏
	ۦܫ|ܯ ൈ ܫ	ۧ, ∀	ܯ ∈ ܩ.  
It follows that demand function take this form: 	݂ሺ݌ሻ ൌ 	 ۦ௣|௘ۧۦூ|ெഥ∙ூ	ۧ 	ܲିଵ ൈ ܯഥ ൈ ܫ	 , 
where ݌ ൌ 	൭
݌ଵ⋮
݌௟
൱ is the price vector, ݁ ൌ 	൭
݁ଵ⋮
݁௟
൱ the initial endowment of agent 
and ܲ	is	a	diagonal	matrix	with	entries	 ௜ܲ,௝ ൌ ߜ௜௝	݌௝ and ܲିଵ its inverse.   
Teycir Abdelghani Goucha 
	
116 
Proposition 2. The demand function of an agent with referential preferences 
giving by a matrix subgroup 	ܩ ⊆ ܩܮሺ݈, ܴሻ  which verifies axiom 2 does not 
depend on the choice of reference vector	ܴ ∈ ܴାା௟ .  
Proof: At level price 	݌ ∈ ܴାା௟ , and initial endowment 	݁ ∈ ܴା௟ , agent has to 
maximize ݒ௫ such that	ۦ݌|ݔۧ ൌ ۦ݌|݁ۧ where	ݔ ൌ ݒ௫	ሺܯ௫ ൈ ܴሻ. Since all terms are 
positive, and since axiom 1 implies that there is a unique		ݒ௣ ൐ 0, ݒ௥ ൐ 0	 and 
matrices	ܯ௣,ܯ௥	in		ܩ such that 	ܲ ൌ ݒ௣	ሺܯ௣ ൈ ܫሻ	and		ܴ ൌ ݒ௥	ሺܯ௥ ൈ ܫሻ, we have 
then to minimize ݒ௣ ൈ ݒ௥ ൈ ൻܫห	ܯ௣ ൈ ܯ௫ ൈ ܯ௥ ൈ ܫൿ	  for 	ܯ௫ ∈ ܩ . In virtue of 
axiom 2, this minimum which is clearly equal toݒ௣ ൈ ݒ௥ ൈ	ۦܫ|ܯഥ ൈ ܫ	ۧ, is reached 
when 	ܯ௣ ൈ ܯ௫ ൈ ܯ௥ ൌ 	ܯഥ   or more precisely, when 	ܯ௫ ൌ ܯ௣ି ଵ ൈ ܯഥ ൈܯ௥ି ଵ . 
From this we deduce that Max	ݒ௫ ൌ 	 ۦ௣|௘ۧ௩೛ൈ௩ೝൈ	ۦூ|ெഥ∙ூ	ۧ		  and the demand vector 
is 	ܺ ൌ ݂ሺ݌ሻ ൌ 	 ۦ௣|௘ۧ௩೛ൈ௩ೝൈ	ۦூ|ெഥ∙ூ	ۧ	 ܯ௣ି
ଵ ൈ ܯഥ ൈܯ௥ି ଵ ൈ ܴ . By simply noticing that 
	ܫ ൌ ଵ௩ೝ ሺܯ௥ି
ଵ ൈ 	ܴሻ  and 	 ଵ௩೛ ܯ௣ି
ଵ ൌ 	ܲିଵ , we recover the expression ݂ሺ݌ሻ ൌ
	 ۦ௣|௘ۧۦூ|ெഥ∙ூ	ۧ 	ܲିଵ ൈ ܯഥ ൈ ܫ which is independent from the choice of reference vector	ܴ. 
Despite that proposition 2 incites to consider reference vector as neutral entity in 
the choice process, results of example suggest to examine the details of proof. In 
fact, we have seen that for a given price p and a reference vectors	ܴ ∈ ܴାା௟ , 
agent’s demand is given by	the	bundle	ܺ ൌ 	 ۦ௣|௘ۧ௩೛ൈ௩ೝൈۦூ|ெഥ∙ூ	ۧ ܯ௣ି
ଵ ൈ ܯഥ ൈܯ௥ି ଵ ൈ ܴ . 
Maximal reached value is, by consequence, a decreasing function of	ݒ௥. Stated 
otherwise, the less the reference is evaluated, the more the satisfaction or the 
feeling of satisfaction will be higher.   
In the daily business practice, most buyers, especially professionals and 
intermediaries, tend to convince and persuade the seller (often without business 
experience) of the poor quality of its own merchandise. In doing so, they increase 
“margin of appreciation” while they seek to buy at the lowest price. We recover 
here the analysis of economic psychology where framing, which is here the final 
price to be reached, results from a modelled and well-intentioned impression (see 
Keizer, 2010, pp. 34-35). This influence is often exerted by referring to other 
goods which are both readily identifiable and having some proximity and 
resemblance to goods and services to be acquired or to sell. It is a kind of 
legitimation of the suggested price that one seeks rather to impose by the recourse 
to reference frames which have a certain recognized value. In all markets we often 
hear phrases such that: Sir, the apartment of your neighbour is on sale since three 
years... or, your car, Madam, is older than the YZ sold for less than $1000, etc.  
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That practice is also very common in the labour market where pressure on wages 
is justified by minimizing the contributions of employees and the value of their 
labour intake by some typical arguments in reference to other situations: we can 
earn more if we relocate our company or more explicitly: our direct competitors 
have cut year-end bonuses by half.  
Accepting by someone the reference proposed by the other is equivalent to take as 
given a certain interval in which the amount of transaction will be located. 
Inspired by the social approach (Keizer, 2010, pp. 34-35), we can say that the 
framing is coming from impression or first estimate which one agent attempts to 
impose to other one. Whether the impression comes from some real data of 
market, or is just a sales tactic to increase gain, it does not fit into the topic of this 
paper. One of the main ideas expressed in this paper is the identification of 
referential as source of impression which we have also called the first estimate. 
The framing resulting from reference vector R depends of the value 
ݒ௥ ∈ 	ܴା∗ 	where	ܴ ൌ ݒ௥ܯ௥ ൈ ܫ.  
To conclude this brief discussion it should be noted that we just made some 
simple observations about the nature of RV and its potential role in the choice 
process and effective decision made by economic actors. A more elaborate work 
should be conducted to improve our understanding of preferences and reference 
vectors and their impact on market exchange mechanisms. In agreement with 
proposition 2 and its interpretation, the starting point would be to look at 
rationality as an extreme hypothesis nuanced in practices.  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we establish a connection between the assumption of perfect 
rationality of economic agents, and other approaches that postulate psychic and 
social aspects. This connection established within the referential preferences 
framework allowed the identification of reference vectors as a common base of 
substantive and procedural analysis. Preliminary observations made in this article 
should be more clarified with other mathematical propositions and a deeper 
understanding of their economic and social interpretations. 
 
 
Note 
	
(1) This remark remains true if we consider relative value instead of the value itself.   
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